We look at the implications of a cross-border merger upstream in a vertically related industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded. JEL Classification Code: L13, L42, D43, R32, F10, F12
Introduction
Our not so distant memory, of the merger boom of this millennium, recorded the value of worldwide mergers sky-rocketing to an all-time high nearly half of which was accounted by cross-border mergers 1 . While the current global crises have dampened this trend, there is a growing consensus 2 that "a new wave" of cross-border mergers will be triggered by the imminent exit of public funds from ailing industries in the immediate aftermath of the crises 3 . With this backdrop, in this paper, we extend 4 the work of Braid (2008) to demonstrate the effect of a cross-border merger between upstream firms on the equilibrium locations of downstream firms selling different varieties of a product.
Model and Propositions
Consider a vertically related 5 R decides to accept a contract offered, the fixed fee
M at this stage. In the third stage, R and * R engage in spatial price discrimination. In the final stage, quantities are demanded by consumers from the upstream firms at which time the wholesale price has to be paid for each unit that is ordered and then sold in the retail market to consumers.
As usual, the game is solved by backward induction. We can then make a comparison between the pre-merger and post-merger (where the upstream firms merge across borders) equilibria with spatial price discrimination. For expositional convenience, let
In the pre-merger autarkic equilibrium, each upstream firm will charge a wholesale price () w and a fixed fee () F that extracts all of the profits from each downstream firm.
The profits of R , from selling varieties U and W, are
The profits of * R , from selling varieties V and W, are
Due to the symmetric structure of the game,
Solving the first order conditions for profit-maximization, we obtain The profits of R , from selling varieties U and W, are
Solving the first order conditions for profit-maximization, we obtain This leads to our second proposition. 7 
Proposition II. Under free trade, the pre-merger Nash equilibrium locations of the two downstream firms, in a vertically related industry, is
.
If M and * M merge, under free trade, the merged upstream firm ( M ) will charge a uniform wholesale price w and a fixed fee F that extracts all of the profits from each downstream firm. The profits of R , from selling varieties U and W, are
Solving the first order conditions for profit-maximization, we obtain 
Conclusion
Our analysis is a natural follow up of continued efforts to assess the consequences of cross-border mergers in industries with a vertical structure 10 . Absent free trade, in a vertically related industry, the downstream firms will not choose the social optimum under spatial price discrimination when none of the downstream firms produce all the varieties that consumers demand. We show that free trade will induce the downstream firms to gravitate toward the social optimum but an upstream merger across borders, under free trade, will pull the downstream firms away from the social optimum back to their autarkic positions. 
